s evaluators, we should care about unintended consequences because they limit our ability to detect and explain the outcomes of the programs we evaluate. To know how to handle unintended consequences, we need to know where they come from. There is a voluminous literature on that subject. The writing encompasses two broad categories: (a) explanations of unintended consequences in particular fields or settings and (b) more general explanations of why such consequences occur. With respect to the former, there is hardly a corner of program or policy planning that has not seen analyses of unintended consequences. A sense of the variety of these analyses emerges from a literature review that spans only the past 3 years. Examples from that review include the industry sponsorship of university research (Behrens & Gray, 2001 ), marketing (Fry & Polonsky, 2004) , tobacco restrictions (Hoek, 2004) , drinking age regulation (DiNardo & Lemieux, 2001) , speed and quality relationships in new product development (Lukas & Menon, 2004) , welfare (Courtney, Needell, & Wulczyn, 2004) , national fiscal reform (Kildegaard, 2001) , teacher empowerment (Pugh & Zhao, 2003) , nongovernmental organization activity in developing countries (Stiles, 2002) , and workplace safety (Kaminski, 2001) .
General explanations for unintended consequences are typified by the works of Tenner (1996) and Dorner (1996) . These explanations focus on the nature of complex systems: multiple interacting processes, nonlinear interactions, rich cross-linkages, long feedback loops, sensitive dependence on initial conditions, the inability to completely specify all relevant variables, and adaptations of environments to change. Three behavioral factors weave through these system dynamics: (a) Our decision making is usually based on less relevant information than we could actually have available, (b) we are insufficiently vigilant in scouting for telltale changes to systems, and (c) the nature of planning is such that opportunity for powerful intervention and change exists at only limited times in the life cycle of a policy or a program.
Although this literature is interesting and enlightening, it is unhelpful to evaluators, because it does not address evaluation methodology. It is written from the point of view of policy and program planners and thus does not consider the question of what evaluators can do when faced with the conflict between two competing design requirements, the need to make evaluation as powerful as possible by planning carefully in advance, and the need to be flexible enough to provide useful information about unintended consequences of program action.
There is no magic that will make the invisible visible. There are, however, ways to increase the range of what can be seen, and to provide glimpses, however hazy, of consequences that were previously completely invisible. Increasing the number of consequences that can be seen, and the clarity of our vision, is the topic of this article.
Unintended Consequences: The Unforeseen and the Unforeseeable
A critical notion for evaluators' engagement with unintended consequences is an appreciation of two types of such consequences: those that are unforeseen and those that are unforeseeable. Depending on the extent of each, there are differences in why uncertainty exists and what tactics evaluators can use to deal with them. It is useful to think in terms of a continuum where pure unforeseen consequences are at one end, and pure unforeseeable consequences are at the other. In the real world, there are no pure cases, but in situations that are high on the "unforeseen," a reasonable amount of the surprise could plausibly be identified and folded into an evaluation design. In cases that are high on the "unforeseeable," adaptive and nonlinear phenomena make prognostication impossible. One could consider "overlooked consequences" as a third type. Here, consequences are known but deliberately ignored for practical, political, or ideological reasons. These consequences are important, but understanding them would require concepts that would extend the already broad scope of this article.
To summarize what follows, unforeseen consequences emerge from weak application of analytical frameworks and from failure to capture the experience of past research. Reasons for unforeseeable consequences stem from the uncertainties of changing environments combined with competition among programs occupying the same ecological niche. Tactics for dealing with the unforeseen include appreciation of life cycle behavior; the use of interdisciplinary teams; search for insight from past research; planning methods such as alternate scenario planning, assumption-based planning, and back-casting; limiting temporal and causal distance between intervention and outcome; and group process techniques for managing high-conflict, large-group settings. Tactics for dealing with the unforeseeable focus on developing agile evaluation designs. They draw from methods of environmental scanning, futures markets, retrospective logic modeling, the choice of data that do not lock designs into a narrow set of analyses, the exploitation of existing data, and the judicious use of advisory boards. Table 1 briefly summarizes these tactics.
Unforeseen Consequences: Root Causes
Unforeseen refers to situations where applicable analytical frameworks and experience were not considered when projecting what might happen when a program is implemented. This is not to say that specifics can be predicted in advance. Rather, it is to say that methods are available that can reveal the contours of likely events and that evaluation designs can be developed to assess events that transpire within those contours.
High-stakes testing illustrates these kinds of unforeseen consequences. One source of insight comes from systems theory. A second comes from the field of education. The high-stakes testing movement is, in many ways, an effort to apply a single, overriding, outcome measure to the multidimensional educational system. Systems perspectives have much to say about the consequences of such efforts. They tell us that systems will divert resources, and change services, to meet performance criteria. They tell us that sometimes, the pursuit of a single objective is necessary, but such pursuit is only useful over a short period of time, or under extraordinary circumstances, as for instance when an organism is fighting for survival. They tell us that long run survival and growth almost always require the joint optimization of a number of conflicting objectives. And from the field of education, we know that when particular objectives are set, or tests mandated, classroom teachers will mobilize to "teach to the test," regardless of other stated objectives of the education system (Firestone, Schorr, & Monfils, 2004) . This is not to argue that high-stakes testing is a good or a bad idea, either as an objective or as a way to force organizational change. Nor is it to say that had the consequences been thought out in more detail, people would have, or should have, acted differently. It is only to say that given our state of knowledge at the time, many unforeseen (and hence unexamined) consequences could have been revealed and presumably could have been entered into the policy debate.
Unforeseeable Consequences: Root Causes
Evolutionary biology provides a useful framework for understanding why unforeseeable consequences arise:
• Any single program can be viewed as an organism competing in a complex ecology populated by other programs, policies, and political and social agendas, all of which are undergoing their own change processes. Some of the competition may simply be for a share of limited resources. In other cases there may be conflict over goals and objectives, as might be the case, for example, between the needs of military readiness and the economic development value of weapons systems or between health promotion efforts and agricultural subsidies.
• To say that we are evaluating a program is to say that we are focusing our evaluation knowledge and wisdom on only one of many inhabitants of a complex ecology. To say we look at a logic model for a program is to say that we are developing a logic model for only a single entity within this complex ecology.
• As change in a single inhabitant of the ecology takes place, opportunities and challenges of the other programs in the environment are affected. They will begin to coevolve, that is, to enter a process of continually adjusting to one another's changes.
• A useful way to consider this change is to think of each program as residing at a location on a typographical map called a "fitness landscape." On this landscape, success is represented by moving to a higher location. Programs compete by climbing higher and faster than their neighbors. The shape of the landscape determines how much impact any given lateral movement on the map might have. Think of rugged versus gently rolling terrain. In one case a small change in lateral distance can land one at the bottom of a cliff or the top of a mountain. In the other, small steps lead to small changes. To complicate matters, the shape of the landscape itself may change as a result of the patterns of success and failure of its inhabitants. (Kauffman, 1995 , provided a good explanation of this phenomenon in terms of complex adaptive systems. Marion, 1999 , showed how the concept can be applied to a complex-adaptive-systems critique of organizational theory.)
• To say that a program has unintended consequences is to say that the behavior of this dynamic ecology cannot be determined in advance. This is a reasonable view because as a program changes, each inhabitant of its environment has many choices as to how to respond, which in turn affects the system as a whole. Thus, unlike programs at the unforeseen end of the continuum, no matter how carefully we look, the course of events cannot be discerned.
To continue this line of reasoning, why do so many unintended consequences seem undesirable? (I have not counted, but I believe that this is the case.) It is because of the following reasons:
• Any evaluation takes place from the point of view of one program in a complex environment.
• The resource base in the environment, at least in the short run, is relatively stable. Thus, much change is zero sum or close to it.
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• Therefore, if we define "good" change from the narrow perspective of a single program climbing its fitness landscape, most responses from surrounding organisms will redound to the detriment of the program being evaluated; that is, the response will register as unexpected and undesirable.
To illustrate, consider the case of the automobile. When the automobile first came on the scene, it held great promise to improve the quality of life in urban areas. (Just consider the amount of manure generated in places such as New York City in the late 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century.) As the automobile developed, a set of interrelated changes took place. The suburban lifestyle expanded. Highway systems proliferated. Inexpensive gasoline became abundant. Global development increased hydrocarbon emissions. Production technology made automobiles affordable to the masses. Efficient methods of oil exploration and refining developed. All these events unfolded at a time when scientific knowledge about the consequences of carbon dioxide emissions were not only unknown but unknowable. Only recently did we develop the combination of computing power and remote sensing needed to do the appropriate analyses. Furthermore, the feedback loops were decades long, thus making it difficult to relate action to consequence.
From the evolutionary point of view, the automobile scenario exhibits consequences of action that were unknowable because the course of events was determined by the continual interaction of many organisms, with the ecosystem characterized by a complicated array of cross-linkages, symbiotic relationships, competitive pressures, and changing fitness landscapes. Earlier I made the point with regard to high-stakes testing that while specifics may have been unpredictable, many contours of the consequences were eminently knowable. In the case of the automobile, the opposite is true. No matter how hard we could have looked, no matter how interdisciplinary the searchers, consequences could not have been known in advance.
Placing Settings on the Continuum: The Problem of Knowing the Difference
The discussion so far has had the great benefit of hindsight. We know a lot about high-stakes testing and the history of the automobile. The problem for evaluators is that we deal with current programs and current problems. Faced with real challenges, it is not easy to discern whether consequences that are not seen or understood, are in some theoretical sense, unknown or unknowable.
Unforeseen Consequences
As a general approach for working our way out of this conundrum, a useful starting assumption is that any given evaluation consists of a range of consequences arrayed along the unforeseen ↔ unforeseeable continuum; that is, they are consequences that can be thought of as having attributes of the unforeseen and the unforeseeable, in varying degrees. As a start, it is necessary to drive as much as possible as far toward the unforeseen end of the continuum as possible. This needs to be done because better evaluation methodologies can be developed for outcomes at that end of the continuum. Easy to say, but we are faced with a fundamental problem. We do not know what to look for. The problem is akin to herding invisible cats roaming an illdefined territory. We need a way to find them and to sweep them up, without knowing exactly what to look for or where to look. As difficult as this task seems, if the right steps are taken, and if the time frames for evaluation are relatively short, a significant number of previously unforeseen consequences can be detected. Useful tactics fall into two broad categories: • evaluation methods and • diversity of input into evaluation design.
Evaluation Methods
Methods useful for dealing with unforeseen consequences can be classified in terms of
• causes of change, • building on the already known, and • futures and time frames.
Causes of change. One promising tactic is to search for life cycle dynamics that may be driving a change. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) made the point that change occurs for four fundamental reasons: teleology, life cycle, dialectics, and evolution. Teleological and life cycle changes have strong implications for helping reveal unforeseen consequences. Teleological change refers to the notion that goals are the drivers of change, that is, that entities "use" their goals as determinants of how they will change. This is evaluation's strong suit. We are practiced at working with stakeholders to identify goals and at helping programs keep goals in mind as they manage their affairs. Life cycle changes are driven by mechanisms that produce predictable sequences of events. The obvious domain of these kinds of changes is the life sciences, but life cycles are also manifest in many other fields. A few of a great many examples are organizational climate and performance in research and development organizations (Sherman & Olsen, 1996) , research and development project management (Pillai, Joshi, & Rao, 2001) , innovation management in companies (Koberg, Uhlenbruck, & Sarason, 1996) , organizational growth and financial performance (Flamholtz & Hua, 2002) , strategy formation (Y. P. Gupta & Chin, 1993) , alliance behavior (Lambe & Spekman, 1997) , software development (Boehm & Egyed, 1999) , and innovation adoption (Adner, 2004) . Dialectic change results from conflict resolution. Evolutionary change results from adaptation to environments. Both are related to the discontinuities and nonlinear effects that characterize unforeseeable change.
Although life cycle changes are reasonably predictable, important aspects of life cycle behavior are often missed by evaluators. Logic models frequently recognize short-and longterm outcomes but fail to recognize internal developmental processes that may be at play. As an example, consider the task of evaluating a community college program that was designed to prepare students for jobs in a field that lacks qualified workers. What might the typical evaluation questions be? (a) Is there really a need for the workers? (b) What skills do the trainees need? (c) Are those skills incorporated into the curriculum? (d) Is the instructional design sound? (e) Do the students acquire the skills? (f) Does the program have links to the job market (e.g., job fairs, guest speakers from industry, internships)? (g) Are the graduates competitive in the job market? (h) Do graduates succeed on the job?
Now, compare two such programs. In the first, the underlying on-the-job technology is mature and stable, whereas in the second, there is rapid development and turnover. (Welding vs. computer animation is a good example.) In the stable technology case, the questions outlined above would suffice for a useful evaluation. In the evolving technology case, however, success or failure might depend on the synchronization of three life cycles: (a) technology obsolescence rate of the on-the-job technology, (b) technology replenishment at the community college's computer laboratories, and (c) the refresh rate of skills among the faculty members. To finish the example, consider a pattern of findings that showed a steady high rate of skill acquisition among the students, student evaluations that rated teaching as high quality, and early success of students in the job market, all followed by a precipitous decline in students' marketability, even Morell / Unintended Consequences of Program Action 449 though job market demand remained high. The root cause for this unforeseen pattern of results might well be failure to consider the obsolescence, replenishment, and skill refresh life cycles during the planning of the evaluation.
Building on the already known. Few programs are truly unique. Many of the problems we try to ameliorate have been around for a long time, and most seemingly innovative solutions have familiar components. In addition, bodies of social science research outside the domain of program evaluation are often relevant to the problem at hand. Thus, it is likely that a great deal of previous knowledge can be brought to bear on the development of a logic model for any new program. Of course, the experience base is not equal. For instance, there is an extensive literature on the evaluation of HIV/AIDS prevention programs, whereas there is considerably less information on programs that use Internet based technologies to help patients manage chronic disease. Despite the unevenness of depth, it is a safe assumption that useful previous evaluation and research has been carried out. (In any case, to assume otherwise would be dangerous.)
To extend an example used previously, a recent critique by Sternberg (2004) takes the No Child Left Behind Act to task for not recognizing well-researched realities. To quote Sternberg,
The act recognized the need for accountability in schools, as well as for educational practice to be based on scientifically rigorous educational research. But it is having and will continue to have the opposite effect. The reason is that it flies in the face of much of what we know about the science of education.
Sternberg then went on to cite research on relationships between schooling and both socioeconomic status and students' learning skills, to name just a few of his criticisms.
It seems almost trite to recommend an old-fashioned literature review, but many programs, policies, and evaluations begin without a rigorous determination of what similar efforts have achieved in the past. Making such a determination would undoubtedly reveal possible consequences that were not foreseen by a current program's developers.
Futures and time frames. Evaluation as we practice it usually assumes only a single future for a program, that is, a single end state around which we develop our logic models. This approach makes sense because it parallels the planning process underlying the programs we evaluate. Programs are conceived, developed, funded, and implemented to address a more or less well defined problem or set of problems. Those goals naturally structure evaluation plans. As evaluators, we are duty bound to measure program behavior relative to the stated objectives of planners. But we are not obligated to restrict ourselves to those objectives.
To discover possible alternate outcomes, we can borrow the technique of scenario planning that has been well developed in strategic planning (Godet, 2000; O'Brien, 2003) . With scenario planning, several alternate plausible futures are developed so that an organization can make wise choices as to how the world is moving and therefore how the organization should prepare for new realities. Scenario planning provides systematic methodologies for developing a relatively few scenarios that are likely to cover a wide range of likely development paths.
Multiple scenario planning can also be useful in evaluation because with alternate scenarios in hand, a wider range of evaluation possibilities comes into view. An example of this approach is my evaluation (Morell, 2004) of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) Electronic Data Access (EDA) system. EDA is a contract support system that combines Web-based technologies and document management to eliminate paper and to provide a single, complete source of information to the numerous personnel who need access to contract information. In that evaluation, it was fairly clear that if EDA worked as intended, it would have an immediate impact by decreasing contract-processing labor. However, it was not at all clear what would happen after that. Second-order consequences were dependent on a variety of uncertain changes in EDA's environment. To articulate these different scenarios, and to provide the client with a sense of the possibilities, the logic model shown in Figure 1 was used. Figure 1 illustrates that only one outcome will immediately flow from EDA, that is, a reduction in the number of labor hours needed to do contract processing. Four second-order outcomes are reasonable expectations as the consequence of reduced labor effort. Those second-order outcomes, however, are dependent on a variety of possible changes in the environment. For instance, budget reductions can be imposed, a higher level of reorganization may sweep across the landscape, or the contract processing organization may be handed a new mission.
It may also be useful to apply techniques such as assumption-based planning (Dewar, 2002 ) and back-casting (Dreborg, 1996) to multiple scenarios. In assumption based planning, assumptions are first identified, and then further exercises consider load-bearing assumptions (those susceptible to breakage by future events), signposts (leading indicators of problems), shaping actions (to support uncertain assumptions), and hedging actions (to prepare for the possibility of failure). Back-casting is a technique that posits a desired future and then systematically works backward to see how one might arrive there from a present state.
Limiting the time frame. In spite of rigorous scenario planning, completely unexpected change is not only possible but probable. One way to reduce the probabilities is to decrease the "distance" between an innovation and the outcomes to be measured. The smaller the distance, the greater the chance that scenario planning will anticipate actual events. Distance has both a temporal and a causal dimension. The temporal dimension refers to the latency between an innovation and an observed change. The longer the latency, the greater the probability that interactions between a changing environment and a program will result in unanticipated trajectories. The causal dimension refers to how direct an impact a program is expected to have on various outcomes. The critical issue for both of these dimensions is that changes in the environment will intervene in unpredictable ways. In a sense, as distance increases, evaluation evolves from an assessment of an innovation's impact, to research on the interaction between an innova- tion and larger scale change. Maximum distance in an evaluation can be defined as the longest term outcome in a logic model. Affecting that distance must be a matter of negotiation between the evaluator and his or her sponsor.
In my experience, the best bargaining point in negotiations about distance rests on the fact that people frequently ask for outcome assessment on the basis of the rhetoric that sold a program or that fits an ideology of long-term change. In both cases I have found that sponsors have an intuitive sense that their particular program is not likely to have a detectible impact on those goals. The winning argument often goes along the following lines: "Do you really want to compete for your next round of funding on the basis of achieving those goals?" This argument may result in a shortening of time horizons. Often, however, time horizons cannot be shortened because of commitments that have been made or the expectations of stakeholders. In such cases, a useful tactic is to develop logic models with as many intermediate impacts as possible and to place those outcomes on two time lines. The first is temporal, that is, placement based on an estimate of how much time it will take from program implementation to observed effect. The second time line is "outcome order." Some outcomes are immediate results of a program's operations, some are secondary and based on the first-order change, and so on. Using both time lines together provides a sense of which changes might realistically be expected from a program and which are vulnerable to the passage of time or the influence of uncertain events.
Diversity of Input Into Evaluation Design
As a general principle, we can expect that diverse points of view brought to bear on a problem will yield a better solution than a unidimensional effort at problem solving. By "better," I mean that a greater number of relevant aspects of a problem will be revealed, that a greater range of solutions will be discerned, and that a more powerful solution is likely to be developed. The reason is that real-world problems are multidimensional, and as team diversity increases, so too does the amount of information, the number of analytic processes, the experience base, and the theoretical perspectives that are brought to bear on problem solving. Multiple perspectives are not guaranteed to result in better decisions, but they are likely to if four conditions are met: (a) Diverse opinion is input into the decision making process, (b) each individual's opinion is independent of other views that may be expressed, (c) contributors are able to draw on their unique knowledge, and (d) there is an effective mechanism for aggregating individual opinion into a collective decision (Surowiecki, 2004) .
The value of diverse perspectives is manifest with respect to stakeholder representation, domain expertise, and coordination. Stakeholder representation is familiar to evaluators. We are well schooled in acting on the principle that stakeholders should have a say in evaluation and that their knowledge contributes to doing evaluation well. In fact, these principles form the core of several well-known approaches to evaluation, for example, utilization-focused evaluation (Patton, 1996) and empowerment evaluation (Fetterman & Wandersman, 2005) .
Varied domain expertise is important because different fields contain unique analytical perspectives that can address different aspects of complicated problems. For example, Morgan (1997) presented the case of a company ("Multicom") where a decision by two partners led to the defection of two others. Among other perspectives, Morgan showed how political theory is useful for explaining the impact of moving away from a fully participatory style of decision making, how organizational culture highlights the consequences of violating shared values, and how an organismic view reveals impact on the company's ability to adapt to its business environment.
Coordination matters because poor coordination generates unwanted surprise. An outstanding example is the case of concurrent engineering in manufacturing (Fleischer & Liker, 1997) . A well-known problem in manufacturing is the inefficiency that derives from throwing designs and specifications "over the wall" from one department to another. Time and cost increase because discussions such as the following do not take place:
Design: If we make it look like this, it will work really well, and people will want to buy it. Manufacturing: Do you really need to include that complex shape on the rear? If you do, it will increase tooling costs by 20%. Design: We can meet our specifications if we decrease the curvature by 5°. Can you manufacture that within cost?
Guidelines for team formation. Without practical guidelines for team formation the suggestion to use multidisciplinary teams is useless. Team formation has several fundamental problems. First, there will almost always be more candidates for membership than can be accommodated. To complicate matters, there is no certain way to know in advance all the expertise that would best serve the interests of developing an evaluation plan.
With respect to stakeholders, start with the usual suspects: the core group of service providers, service recipients, and funders who are directly involved with the program being evaluated. As the process unfolds, logic modeling will reveal other sets of stakeholders: the groups that will have to adapt to the inputs, outputs, or interfaces that will be perturbed as the program develops.
With respect to domains of expertise, the problem of team choice is murky. Primary group membership is obvious. For instance consider an innovation designed to reduce length of stay in a hospital by providing more intensive home care through Internet-based monitoring of the patient's condition. At first blush, one would develop an evaluation team with physicians who could identify health status outcome measures, psychologists who knew about assessing wellbeing and quality of life, and social workers who could identify family stress factors that might derive from sicker patients requiring more attention from family members.
But who else should be involved? What would a business planner include in the evaluation of an innovation that affected an organization's financial viability, cash flow, and operating costs? What might an expert in organizational behavior want to see measured when contemplating a change that affected power relationships between the departments of home health care, nursing, and information technology? Might that expert conjure up factors such as employee morale, organizational culture, coalition formation, and power?
The above example seems obvious in retrospect, but how is one to know in advance which perspectives to include? For insight as to how to proceed, consider a thought experiment:
• A rigorous effort to identify possibly useful perspectives yields x candidates.
• An evaluation team is formed consisting of the preselected core group, plus some fraction of the remaining possibilities.
• A logic model is developed on the basis of the expertise of the team.
• Noncore members of the evaluation team are thrown back into the candidate pool.
• Another sample is drawn, and a new evaluation plan is developed.
• The process is repeated many times.
I suspect that in every case, a stronger evaluation would emerge than would appear if the team were not interdisciplinary. Each evaluation would differ in detail, but in each case, it would be better (i.e., it would identify more relevant variables) and would do a better job at hypothesizing relationships among them. I also believe that when the entire group of evaluation plans is considered, (on average) there would be a high level of similarity in their broad outlines and general approach. This would be the case for two reasons. First, each group would still contain Morell / Unintended Consequences of Program Action 453 the core group of experts and stakeholders that were formed from the (hopefully informed) set of initial choices. Second, no matter how the evaluation team might change, the most powerful forces acting on the design would remain constant. The nature of the program, time lines for decision making, funding constraints, organizational setting, key stakeholders, imposed requirements for balance between process and outcome, and stakeholders'expectations would all remain constant regardless of the makeup of the evaluation team.
The discussion above makes the implicit assumption that more diversity is better. This assumption is only partially true. At some point the diversity of the team will make the evaluation unwieldy. As Mathie and Greene (1997) put it in their case studies of diversity in participatory evaluation, "too much diversity may stall or subvert the transformative aims of participatory evaluation because time and resources are rarely available to work through and resolve the complex range of voices and perspectives" (p. 280).
Although at some point, a membership limit will inevitably be reached, there are methods to extend the limits. If the problem is one of managing group process among fractious participants, techniques such as the Delphi method are useful because they avoid face-to-face interaction (U. G. Gupta & Clarke, 1996; Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2001) .
If the problem is simply one of group size, large-group facilitation techniques such as those used in the whole-scale change approach might be useful (Dannemiller Tyson Associates, 2000) . In this technique, there is a continual movement between large groups that represent a set of stakeholders, and subsets of that large group, which are equally representative. The small groups allow classic group process management, while bringing the groups together ensures overall consensus.
A second tactic for dealing with unmanageably large groups is to exploit variation in the extent of connectedness among evaluation components. For instance, an evaluation that measures a program's impact and its sustainability over time might be conceptualized as two relatively separate evaluations. Something, but not too much, would be lost if the evaluations were developed by different teams, with only a small number of people working as boundary spanners. As another example, issues touching on the choice of comparison groups and the method by which members are allocated to each group are inextricably bound. But the discussion of precisely what variables should be measured in questionnaires can be carried out relatively independently of the discussion about group makeup.
Integration Across Tactics
For the purposes of exposition, the tactics outlined above were presented as if each stood alone. In reality, each can potentiate the other. To cite only three of many examples: (a) Identifying life cycle dynamics, using interdisciplinary teams, and plumbing past research can all combine to yield more perceptive scenario development; (b) members of an interdisciplinary team will bring the lessons of different research literatures to bear on logic model development; and (c) life cycle knowledge can assist in building alternate future scenarios.
This section began by posing the challenge of how to reveal invisible but detectible consequences of program action. A fully satisfactory solution to this problem is impossible. But by integrating the tactics suggested here, useful partial solutions can be developed.
Unforeseeable Consequences
The previous section focused on analysis, that is, on how people and knowledge can be organized to reveal as many consequences of program action as possible. In this section the empha-sis shifts away from analysis and onto agility, that is, the ability of an evaluation to adapt to changing circumstances.
Before delving into detail, some cautions are in order concerning what this section is and is not. It is not an argument for abandoning careful planning or an emphasis on assessing predetermined outcomes. Programs, no matter the source of their design or funding, are investments that have been made in good faith, with the expectation of particular consequences. It is reasonable and right to assess those consequences. This section is about the ability of evaluation to provide information on change that comes from a program but lies outside the realm of original expectations. Agile evaluation requires mechanisms to detect developing consequences as early as possible and designs that can accommodate to the measurement requirements of those consequences.
Detection
With respect to detection, we can build on the methodology of program monitoring, a wellestablished approach for tracking program operation and outcome. For present purposes, the major shortcoming of program monitoring is its focus on predetermined measures. Monitoring tends to start with an articulation of how a program should behave and what it should accomplish and then proceeds to systematically track whether the "shoulds" reflect reality. In essence, monitoring can be seen as checking on conformance between a program's performance and its logic model (Kaplan & Garrett, 2005) . To develop monitoring as a tool for helping with unintended consequences, we need to extend the approach to be sensitive to novel events. To do so, it is useful to think of monitoring as focused on events that can occur both internal to an evaluation's scope and outside of that scope.
Internal monitoring. As a working definition, "internal to evaluation scope" can be considered elements within an evaluation's logic model, that is, some element of a program or its behavior that is deliberately taken into account by an evaluation team. Those models can be extremely useful for identifying where change may occur and what kinds of change may occur. The problem with this neat formulation is that logic models often fail to adequately explain how a program performs and how it operates. Because plans, implementations, and stakeholder expectations often evolve, logic models must be revisited as programs develop. Also, logic models cannot be comprehensive or complete in every detail. As a result, programs may not develop as intended, perform as planned, or meet current expectations. To capture this variation, open-ended qualitative assessments should be incorporated into evaluation designs.
A good example of these kinds of problems can be found with the Drug Abuse Resistance Education program (D.A.R.E.). The ostensible reason for this program was to reduce the use of illicit substances. Despite many evaluations that indicated that D.A.R.E. does not meet its stated goal, it remains a popular program. One important reason for the popularity is that D.A.R.E. is thought to have other desirable accomplishments such as improving relationships among students, their families, and law enforcement (Birkeland, Murphe-Grahm, & Weiss, in press ).
One could argue that these other goals were always present and that had evaluators done a good enough job in planning their evaluation, they would have registered these as important goals. The truth may never be known, but other explanations seem equally plausible. One possibility is that a stakeholder analysis may have identified these goals but not have recognized them as important enough to include in an evaluation. Or these goals may have been hidden (or nonexistent) even in the minds of stakeholders and emerged (or were invented) only when evaluation of the main objective proved D.A.R.E. wanting.
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My point is that any real life program will have a host of goals, some stated and some unstated, some of high priority and some of low priority. Evaluators cannot be expected to get the priorities right in advance because priorities may shift in unpredictable ways. Whether this phenomenon can be classified as an unforeseeable consequence, it looks like an unforeseeable consequence from the point of view of evaluation. In other words, it is an effect of the program that cannot be planned for in advance and develops over time. The sooner a monitoring process can register the development, the sooner evaluators can implement a measurement methodology.
External monitoring. Scanning outside the scope of a logic model is analogous to a central problem that planners have, that is, that circumstances force continual revision in any plan that was fixed at any point in time. Their solution is to think of planning as a continual process that is constantly revised on the basis of a systematic search for information.
In strategic planning prototyping means that there is no "final plan," but rather that planning is an ongoing process. One does one's best to decide a strategy, formulate implementation plans and put the plans into action. However, one also plans data gathering to aid in later revising objectives, plans, products, and processes. (Gilmore & Camillus, 1996, p. 871) Evaluators' opportunities for environmental scanning vary. Terms of engagement may strictly limit the outcomes that evaluators might consider. Relationships between evaluators and their clients may not be rich enough to provide the needed information. Mechanisms for scanning may not have been established. Resources may be limited. Deadlines may intrude. But seldom are there no opportunities to detect trends and events that may influence what a program may accomplish and how it should be evaluated. In fact, minimal resources may suffice because likely sources of important environmental change are often easily identifiable and easily monitored. Consider for instance, factors such as demographic trends, unemployment rates, pending regulatory actions, disease prevalence, and competing programs (e.g., tobacco subsidies and smoking cessation). These are the kinds of environmental changes that can affect the types of programs we evaluate, and all can be tracked with minimal effort.
Futures.
A radically different approach to systematic scanning eschews deliberate process in favor of using the mechanism of futures markets to predict events on the basis of aggregating the collective knowledge, beliefs, and intuition of individuals acting independently. A considerable body of theoretical research and case examples are emerging which demonstrates the effectiveness of this technique. Examples of topics treated include election results, the Academy Awards, movie box office receipts, sales of consumer items, and the outcome of unfolding events such as the war in Iraq and Kobe Bryant's legal problems (Plott & Chen, 2002; Snowberg, Wolfers, & Zitzewitz, 2005; Surowiecki, 2004; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) . These kinds of markets can succeed with only a relatively small number of participants and small (or even no) amounts of money being traded. Moreover, established commercial services are available to set up and run such markets (e.g., Intrade.com). Thus, the technique is not only proven but commercially available. I am aware of no effort to use a futures market to monitor a program's activity. But given the track record of these markets and the availability of the technology, I believe that it offers a promising method for early detection of changes in a program's impact.
Early detection is only useful because it provides planning time to implement new elements of an evaluation. The value of that time depends on the agility of the evaluation. To take an extreme view, if a design is totally inflexible, no amount of lead-time will help. In reality it is always possible to improvise some kind of evaluation to address new realities. The objective though, should be to make those designs as rigorous as possible. To do so one must be concerned with logic models and data.
Logic Models
Logic models contribute to methodology development because they connect program action with program outcome. As a result, logic models can help identify what process variables and outcomes to measure, what groups to compare, how much time after implementation we need before effects can be observed, what causal chains to expect if a program worked as planned, and whether particular methodologies are feasible. All this, however, is prospective. Logic modeling is an exercise that takes place before an evaluation is implemented, as part of an effort to decide what form the evaluation should take. But what if the program and its evaluation have been implemented and unexpected events occur? One view is that the logic model failed. "Failure" however, implies that success is possible. In fact, divergence between logic model and reality is inevitable because for it to be otherwise, an abstract, simplified model would have to fully specify a system; that is, the model would have to describe a deterministic system. That is not how real programs in the real world operate. A more useful perspective is that of strategic planners, who see plans as useful for a particular time but in need of constant revision as circumstances change.
Evaluators, however, are faced with a greater challenge than the planners. Evaluators must develop logic models that look backward as well as forward. Fortunately there is a rich source of knowledge as to how this can be done. Retrospective logic models are, in a sense, the stock in trade of the continuous improvement (CI) tools found in industrial engineering (Morell, 2000) . CI is a set of tools and a method of thinking that continually observes process and asks the question: "How can this process be improved?" It is a technique that has been used in a very wide variety of settings, including health care (Ginsburg, 2001; Ryan, Stone, & Raynor, 2004; van Harten, Casparie, & Fisscher, 2000) , education (Detert, Schroeder, & Cudeck, 2002; Huffman & Kalnin, 2003; Lindahl & Fanelli, 2002; Newby, 1999; Sutherland, 2004) , software development (Tian, 1999) , and business and commerce (Fullerton & McWatters, 2001; Garver, 2003; Lee & Whang, 2005) .
A critical part of CI is linking observed activity with its cause, a process generally known as "root-cause analysis." Such linking is, in effect, a retrospective logic model. One of the most prominent methods of root-cause analysis is the use of "fishbone diagrams" to trace an observed problem back to its root causes. To illustrate with a simple hypothetical example, imagine a program designed to increase high school students' enrollment in advanced science courses by developing teaching modules that science teachers can insert into their courses. In this example, the modules are developed by teams of curriculum experts working with classroom teachers. The process plan is to combine the team's work with reviews of previous similar attempts, to develop and test modules, and then to disseminate the modules through established organizations of high school science teachers. Dissemination is expected to lead to implementation, which is then expected to increase students' competency and interest in science. Compe- Lo and behold, there is an unexpected positive outcome. The module development staff find themselves actively engaged in professional development consultation. Leaving aside the question of whether the intended outcomes were achieved, how might this new development be retroactively explained in terms of the actions of the program? The fishbone diagram on the top of Figure 2 can help. Although fishbone diagrams and evaluators' logic models do not look the same, they perform a similar function, and in many ways, are isomorphic. To illustrate, observe the vertical "mapping arrows" that identify elements of the fishbone diagram that have counterparts in the bottom half of Figure 2 . (For clarity, only some of the mapping is shown.)
Of all root-cause tools, fishbone diagrams have the most obvious visual similarity to evaluation logic models. But CI uses other tools as well that serve the purpose of retrospective linking of an observed consequence to past action. One such method is known as the "five whys." For any given event, the question is asked, "Why did the event happen?" Whatever the answer, it is followed by the same "why" question. As a rule of thumb, asking "why" five times gets to a root cause. The technique certainly has many limitations, the most prominent of which is that it does not treat interactions or multiple causes. On the other hand, this method does work in many real life cases to get problem solvers to an aspect of a system, which, if changed, can alter the original observation. Put in pictorial form, the answers to the five whys would look very much like a logic model.
In sum, CI can provide evaluators with a rich set of experiences and tools with which a program's "unexpected consequence" can be linked to a program's actions. With such a link, all the power of logic models can be brought to bear on developing methodologies for evaluation. They can provide a case for whether it is plausible to link the newly observed phenomena to program action. They can help identify groups that should be affected differentially if a change is in fact related to program action. They can help identify other changes that might be occurring (or soon will) if there is a link between a program and the newly observed events.
Data
Specialized instruments and data collection procedures often lock evaluations into predetermined designs. A well-validated scale to measure one particular variable cannot be used to measure another variable. A data collection procedure that is optimized to get data from one particular group, or to fit one particular schedule, cannot be easily adapted for other purposes.
Dedicated instruments and procedures are often unavoidable because meeting evaluation objectives often requires rigid specifications with respect to level of analysis (e.g., individual tests vs. overall grade), definition (e.g., direct cost vs. total cost), quality (reliability and validity), "indexabilty" (the ability to cross-reference diverse sources of data), and collection schedules. The stricter these requirements, the more specialized the data and the more rigid an evaluation's commitment to those data. As long as the data can shed light on unexpected consequences, all is well. However, it stands to reason that the more rigid and specialized the data, the narrower the range of unexpected consequences that can be measured.
A key problem is that by the time unexpected consequences begin to reveal themselves, an evaluation is already committed to a design and a measurement regimen. Few evaluation cases will have no flexibility to change, but by the time the need for change is detected, degrees of freedom will be minimal. The solution lies in maximizing flexibility early in the evaluation life cycle, that is, in the design stage. That is the time when questions are framed, when process indicators and outcomes are defined, when operational measures of variables are agreed on, and when data collection mechanisms are legitimized and implemented.
These activities may seem to take place as part of a sequential process determined by needs that are first articulated by stakeholders. In reality, the process can be far more interactive and iterative. The process is analogous to the concurrent engineering model discussed earlier. One approach is for stakeholders to define needs for information and then to "throw them over the wall" for evaluators to work on. The concurrent model argues for collaboration between program designers and program evaluators.
Whenever opportunity for concurrency arises, there is opportunity to steer data gathering toward a suite of measures that draw on less unique instruments and data collection procedures.
For maximum flexibility, data should come from routinely collected information that resides in established databases. This minimizes switching costs that may be needed to adjust an evaluation design. More important, it provides a familiarity, expertise, and practiced access that increases the possibility of recognizing and implementing new data collection processes to meet hitherto unknown needs.
Reliance on existing data, however, may come at a heavy cost. The problem is that the systems developed for management are often inadequate for evaluation. Thus, agility in the face of unintended consequences may result in an evaluation design that is weak relative to measuring the intended outcomes of a program. There is no perfect solution to this conflict, but careful planning in the design stages of an evaluation can increase the power of designs that rely on existing data. To exploit those data, however, it is necessary to appreciate the pitfalls that may occur.
On the basis of a series of evaluations of e-business systems in the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), I summarized (Morell, 2003 (Morell, , 2004 ) the difficulties of using existing data. First, stakeholders who commission evaluations are often not the owners of the systems that contain the data needed to do the evaluation. From the point of view of an evaluator, this means that one's customers may not be able to provide data that they want the evaluator to have. Moreover, those who control the systems may not be inclined to invest the time and effort needed to provide the desired data. Worse, they may have an incentive not to cooperate. A case in point is my evaluation (Morell, 2003) of Central Contractor Registration (CCR). This evaluation was commissioned by CCR's builders, the DLA. One of the likely benefits of CCR was its contribution to improving the DOD's ability to conform to the Prompt Payment Act. However, although the DLA could provide no end of process data on CCR's functioning, information on meeting payment deadlines was kept by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). Because of the political sensitivity of the information, it was extremely difficult to negotiate the necessary access.
A related problem is that even if owners of data are willing, their information systems may not be able to produce the data in a form needed to assess a change. To continue the previous example, an ideal evaluation of CCR would have been a time series analysis of late payments by DFAS, for particular types of contracts, on a monthly basis. The systems involved, however, could not tell one kind of contract from another and could not produce those data at monthly intervals. Complicating the problem was the fact that DFAS had upgraded its systems over time. Although current data may have been obtainable, historical data could not be pulled from systems that had fallen into disuse. Furthermore, the labels on certain critical data fields sounded as if the contents of those fields would be exactly what we needed. On closer scrutiny, we discovered that the definition of those fields had changed over time. Moreover, values for monthly data were inflated or deflated to correct for error that had been discovered after the books had been closed for each month. As a result, the year-to-date number could be trusted, but the actual monthly values could not. As the evaluation of DLA's e-business systems proceeded, none of the above problems were mentioned by the many people with whom we worked and who earnestly wished us to access the data and evaluate their programs. We were told often, and in good faith, that the necessary data were available.
The CCR case illustrates how using data from information systems in evaluation requires a fine understanding of exactly what is available. Details matter and very few people know those details. It has been our experience that no matter how big an organization, any given database is likely to have no more than two to five people who are close enough to the system to really understand what it can, and cannot, provide. Moreover, the people who know are likely to be buried deep in bureaucracies, far removed from any stakeholder representative with whom an evaluator may be dealing. With luck, the right people can be ferreted out and, when found, will still be at their jobs. Often they have moved on to other positions, thus further complicating the problem of eliciting cooperation. All of the above problems are exacerbated by the fact that data from multiple systems are often required. The evaluation design we ultimately used required data from three different DOD organizations, as well as the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
The tale of woe recited above is not told to discourage use of existing data but to illustrate the need for interaction with stakeholders early in the evaluation design process. Our original plan was to do a simple time series analysis on the basis of information from DFAS. When that plan fell apart, information from multiple sources was used to patch together an evaluation that produced more limited but still useful results. In fact, several such designs were considered and discarded before an evaluation design was settled on. All the possible designs, however, would have been able to make use of existing archival data. Without interaction with stakeholders during evaluation design, we could never have determined which designs would serve and which would not.
Structuring Evaluation to Allow Action
Many of the suggestions above smack of replacement or addition, as in "use one kind of data instead of another" or "add a scanning component to the evaluation." This advice amounts to a suggestion that design elements to make evaluation more agile are just another set of trade-offs that are necessary in any evaluation design exercise. If it is truly impossible to make such tradeoffs because of time and resource constraints, then so be it: The evaluation will be vulnerable to surprise. However, I believe that there is a practical mechanism that can increase agility and that will fit within a great many evaluation designs. This mechanism is the constitution of an evaluation advisory board consisting of diverse experts and stakeholders, who, through regular but infrequent interaction, come to share a collective understanding of the evaluation at hand.
Meeting regularly but infrequently will not break the bank but will result in a shared understanding among the group members of the evaluation's history, purpose, and design that is needed to quickly provide advice on how to deal with surprises detected by environmental scanning. (If volunteers are available, so much the better. And of course, meetings can be virtual and asynchronous, thus minimizing travel costs and scheduling burdens.) By making the board advisory, evaluators maintain freedom of action. By making the board interdisciplinary, a broad range of advice is available. Of course it is only an assumption that regular infrequent board involvement will be an effective hedge against surprise. However, I believe that this assumption is plausible in frequent enough circumstances that it merits serious consideration.
Summary
This article began with a theoretical explanation of why unintended consequences occur and showed how the etiology of unforeseen consequences is different from that of unforeseeable consequences. It continued with the notion that not only are the reasons different but so too are the tactics needed to improve evaluation designs. Tactics for dealing with the unforeseen include appreciation of life cycle behavior, interdisciplinary teaming, exploitation of past research, various planning methodologies, limiting distance between innovation and outcome, and group process for managing large groups and high conflict. Tactics for dealing with the unforeseeable make evaluation agile by applying methods of environmental scanning, futures markets, retrospective logic modeling, flexible data sources, and advisory boards. No solution will completely avoid the unforeseeable or deal with the unforeseen in a completely satisfactory manner. But it is possible to chip away at the problem by using a variety of methods that, taken together, will yield evaluation designs that are much improved over present practice.
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